

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01 TRSE-00 ERDA-05 OES-07 NRC-05
DHA-02 /089 W
-----131623Z 102951 /41

R 131123Z MAY 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7332

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 3702

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, RW(MDW)
SUBJ: RW (MDW)/CW BILATERALS WITH SOVIETS: MAY 12, 1977
GENEVA MESSAGE NO. 7

1. SUMMARY: FINAL MEETING OF RW(MDW) WORKING GROUP HELD MAY 11. SOVIETS REQUESTED CLARIFICATIONS CONCERNING SEVERAL POINTS IN PREVIOUS US PRESENTATIONS AND EXPRESSED VIEW RW AGREEMENT SHOULD BE COMPREHENSIVE IN SCOPE OF COVERAGE. US PROVIDED PRELIMINARY REPLIES. CW TO BE TAKEN UP MAY 13. END SUMMARY.
2. RW (MDW) MEETING OPENED AT 3:30 PM MAY 11 IN SOVIET MISSION WITH STATEMENT BY SOVIET REP LIKHATCHEV. HE OFFERED PRELIMINARY REMARKS AND QUESTIONS ON US STATEMENT OF MAY 10.
3. LIKHATCHEV INDICATED SOVIET SATISFACTION THAT US ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO RW WHICH IN THEIR VIEW IS A DANGEROUS TYPE OF MDW AND MANKIND MUST BE SAFEGUARDED FROM DISASTROUS RESULTS OF USING SUCH WEAPONS. HE AGREED THAT MAY 10 US STATEMENT SET FORTH GENERAL APPROACH AND CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF PROHIBITING USE OF RW. HOWEVER, THEIR EXPERTS WOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION OF
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DEFINITION OF RW, AND ASK FOR CLARIFICATION OF SPECIFIC CASES WHICH MAY NOT FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION. (SEE QUESTIONS FROM ACADEMICIAN FOKIN BELOW).

4. LIKHATCHEV REFERRED TO PORTION OF US MAY 10 STATEMENT IN WHICH IT WAS INDICATED RW AGREEMENT PROVISIONS SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH OTHER EFFORTS IN INTERNATIONAL

FORUMS TO DEVELOP PHYSICAL PROTECTION PROCEDURE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. HE INDICATED SOVIET INTEREST IN SUCH MATTERS AND AGREEMENT THAT NOTHING SHOULD INTERFERE WITH THOSE EFFORTS. HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO KNOW IN WHAT MANNER THE RW QUESTION COULD INTERFERE WITH PHYSICAL PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE.

5. LIKHACHEV ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS. HE ASKED WHAT WAS THE US ULTIMATE GOAL FOR CURRENT BILATERAL TALKS. WAS IT JOINT ACTION INCCD? WHAT ARE FORM AND TIME LIMITS FOR COMPLETION OF CCD EFFORT ON RW? WHAT WOULD BE THE SUBSTANCE OF AN AGREEMENT?

6. LIKHACHEV DISCUSSED THE PROHIBITION OF USE AS A PRIMARY MEASURE WHICH CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IN A COMPREHENSIVE MANNER IF WEAPONS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN STOCKPILES. HE REFERRED TO THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL ON NON-USE OF BW/CW, WHICH "RAISED A BARRIER", BUT POINTED OUT THAT, BECAUSE STATES POSSESSED THE WEAPONS, TO PROHIBIT PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING SUCH WEAPONS HAD STILL BEEN NECESSARY. FOR THE SAME REASON BAN ON DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR RW, IN ADDITION TO PROHIBITION OF USE.

7. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED AND ANSWERED SOVIET QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

1) POINT ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION IS ADDRESSED TO US STATE-CONFIDENTIAL

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MENT AT 31ST UNGA, WHICH INCLUDED CONCEPT OF APPLYING APPROPRIATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION MEASURES TO RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO PREVENT ITS BEING LOST OR STOLEN AND USED FOR UNAUTHORIZED PURPOSES. US AWARE THAT THERE HAS BEEN CONCERN OVER PROVIDING FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL USED IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH FISSIONABLE MATERIAL WHICH MIGHT BE DIVERTED TO MAKE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN LIMITED ONLY TO SUCH MATERIAL. THEY HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED AMONG SUPPLIERS OF FUEL CYCLE MATERIALS, IN RELATION TO THE IAEA AND ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THERE COULD BE SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS IN POSSIBLE RW AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS OF APPROPRIATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF RADIO ACTIVE MATERIAL AND THE TWO SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH EACH OTHER. THE TWO OBJECTIVES FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION SHOULD BE MADE HARMONIOUS WITH EACH OTHER.

8. BUCHHEIM INDICATED US SIDE COULD NOT PROVIDE ANSWER ON THE QUESTION OF CCD FORUM BUT NOTED THAT 1976 UNGA STATEMENT

USG VISUALIZED NEGOTIATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN THE CCD.

9. ON THE QUESTION OF TIMING THE US WOULD APPRECIATE SOVIET VIEW, REALIZING THE CCD IS SENSITIVE ABOUT ITS PRIORITIES. US ANTICIPATED CONSULTATIONS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO OBTAIN VIEWS OF CCD MEMBERS.

10. ON CONTENT AND SCOPE OF AN RW AGREEMENT, US SIDE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WHETHER SUCH AN AGREEMENT SHOULD SIMPLY PROHIBIT THE USE OF RW OR INCLUDE APPROPRIATE MEASURES ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. US SIDE WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OTHER ACTIONS ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE MATERIAL.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 3702

11. ON DEVELOPING THE SCOPE OF AN AGREEMENT BUCHHEIM INDICATED THAT, IN ONE DIMENSION, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THE SCOPE OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION TO INCLUDE OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL NOT IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. IN ANOTHER DIMENSION, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND POSSESSION OF WEAPONS. IN THIS DIRECTION THERE IS CONSIDERABLE COMPLEXITY IN GOING BEYOND SIMPLE PROHIBITION OF USE. THIS IS RELATED TO THE LARGE QUANTITIES OF RADIO ACTIVE MATERIAL ALREADY IN EXISTENCE AND THE ADDED QUANTITIES GENERATED EACH DAY. THIS SUBJECT REQUIRES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BECAUSE OF ITS COMPLEXITY AND SCOPE.

12. LIKHATCHEV RESPONDED STATING THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THERE IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE IN THEIR VIEW, BETWEEN RADIO-

LOGICAL WEAPONS AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL GENERATED BY POWER REACTORS. IF WE COULD AGREE TO PROHIBIT RW WE COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND THERE WILL THEN BE NO DANGER IN ACCUMULATING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.

13. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED BY STATING NO ONE WISHED TO INTERFERE WITH PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, INCLUDING ACCUMULATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. HOWEVER, THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM LEADS TO THE VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THESE MATTERS AS WE DEVELOP THOUGHTS ON AGREEMENT.

14. QUESTION OF LATER BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF RW DURING CCD SUMMER SESSION WAS DISCUSSED WITHOUT CONCLUSION BEING REACHED. BUCHHEIM CLARIFIED THE POINT THAT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD FIRST, THEN IT COULD BE DECIDED HOW TO TAKE THE SUBJECT INTO CCD.

15. SOVIET REP ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF STEPS ON RW AGREEMENT. BUCHHEIM REPLIED MINIMUM ELEMENT WOULD BE A PROHIBITION OF USE AND THAT ANOTHER STEP COULD BE COMMITMENT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ASSURE PROPER PROTECTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. STILL FURTHER STEP COULD BE COOPERATION IN IMPROVING MEASURES OF PROTECTION. AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT APPROACH MIGHT BE TO ADD MEASURES AGAINST PRODUCTION, IF THAT COULD BE MADE PRACTICAL. BUCHHEIM CONCLUDED THAT GOING TOWARD MEASURES AGAINST PRODUCTION MIGHT BE DIFFICULT.

16. ACADEMICIAN FOKIN ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

1) RW ARE MEANS OF ATTACK WHICH CAN IMPACT ON THE HUMAN BODY AND OTHER MATERIALS. RW MAY BE BASED NOT ONLY ON NATURAL RADIATION FROM RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE, BUT ALSO ON RADIATION PRODUCED ARTIFICIALLY BY POWERFUL BEAMS, PRODUCING IONIZING RADIATION. SUCH RADIATION MAY BE PRODUCED BY NEUTRON GENERATORS, AND SPECIAL RADIO FREQUENCY GENERATORS WHICH PRODUCE POWERFUL IMPULSES SIMILAR TO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. FOKIN REFERRED TO HIS 1976 STATEMENT. QUESTION- IS THE SOVIET UNDERSTANDING CORRECT? DOES US DEFINITION OF RW COVER THE USE OF SUCH STREAMS OF CHARGED PARTICLES AS IONIZING RADIATION?

2) US STATEMENT DOES NOT EXTEND TO BAN ON PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM NUCLEAR EX-
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PLOSIONS. HOWEVER, THERE EXIST SOME TYPES OF NUCLEAR BOMBS DESIGNED TO CREATE RADIATION BY USE OF COBALT ("DIRTY BOMBS") OR GENERATE PENETRATING RADIATION ("NEUTRON BOMBS"). DOES US SIDE INCLUDE SUCH BOMBS IN AN RW AGREEMENT?

3) US CITED EXAMPLES OF ISOTOPES WHICH MIGHT BE USED; DOES THE US INCLUDE PU-239, WHICH HAS HIGH TOXICITY AND LONG HALF-LIFE? IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THIS ISOTOPE ALSO POSES SERIOUS PROBLEM BECAUSE OF INCREASING QUANTITIES IN FUEL CYCLE PROCESS AND BREEDER REACTORS.

17. BUCHHEIM RESPONDED TO FOKIN'S QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

1) US IS DISCUSSING POSSIBLE RW AGREEMENT CONCERNING ONLY MATERIALS; WE ARE NOT DISCUSSING RADIATION GENERATED BY ACCELERATORS OR SIMILAR MACHINES.

2) US WOULD NOT INCLUDE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS GENERATED BY NUCLEAR WEAPON EXPLOSIONS, WHICH ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SUBJECT.

3) ON THE QUESTION OF ISOTOPES, BUCHHEIM EXPLAINED US STATEMENTS WERE EXAMPLES BASED ON FOKIN'S 1976 STATEMENT AND AGREED THAT PU 239 WAS AN ISOTOPE WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE RW CONTEXT AND REQUIRED PHYSICAL PROTECTION MEASURES IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE.

18. BUCHHEIM THEN PROVIDED PRELIMINARY US ANSWERS (SEPTTEL) TO PREVIOUS SOVIET QUESTIONS ON FUEL-AIR EXPLOSIVES, INFRA-SOUND AND RADIO FREQUENCY WAVES, TRANS-URANIUM AND TRANS-PLUTONIUM WEAPONS, AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND MEASURES TO FACILITATE VIGILANCE OVER EMERGING MDW.

19. LIKHATCHEV CLOSED RW (MDW) SESSION WITH THE UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT OF BOTH DELS THAT QUESTIONS WOULD BE EXAMINED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND TAKEN UP IN FUTURE SESSIONS
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OF WORKING GROUP. IT WAS AGREED TO OPEN SESSIONS OF CW AT THE US MISSION AT 11 AM ON FRIDAY, MAY 13.

20. FOLLOWING MEETING BUCHHEIM INFORMED LIKHATCHEV THAT IT IMPERATIVE US CW EXPERTS RETURN TO WASHINGTON BY MONDAY MAY 16. LIKHATCHEV UNHAPPY, BUT RESIGNED.SORENSEN

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